Globalization and the public realm by Nardin, Terry
Submitted 16 September 2007 











Globalization can undermine as well as enable public discourse at the 
national, international, and supranational levels. A challenge for political 
theory is to imagine how a global public realm might be constituted. 
Because the public realm has flourished in states whose citizens are related 
under the rule of law, one might ask whether this model of civil association 
can be extended to a broader and potentially universal context. Given the 
contingent obstacles to a global state, realizing civil association globally 
implies a universal confederation of rule-of-law states. If the public realm 
means free deliberation on the laws of a civil association, the ‘global public 
realm’ would include deliberation at all three levels.  
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Many papers could be written about globalization and the public realm, depending 
on how those terms are defined. In this paper, I want to discuss whether the model of civil 
association developed in the context of the modern territorial state can be extended beyond 
that context. How should we understand the idea of a universal civil association? We can 
imagine a single world state whose citizens are related in a way that preserves their liberty 
and basic human rights by subjecting its government to the rule of law. But though we can 
imagine it, a global civil association seems improbable. A more realistic alternative would 
be, as Kant argued and Rawls affirms, a universal confederation of rule-of-law states that 
is itself governed according to the rule of law. How should we understand the idea of a 
public realm in this context? 
For Jürgen Habermas the ‘public realm’ or ‘public sphere’ (Öffentlichkeit) is a 
space in which citizens freely express their opinions on matters beyond their own private 
affairs (Habermas 1974). One might also define it more narrowly but more precisely as a 
space for public discussion of the laws in a civil association. And one might define the 
‘global public realm’ as a space for discussion of the laws in a potentially universal civil 
association, whether unitary or confederal. Such discussion would engage all three levels 
of Kant’s theory of right: national, international, and cosmopolitical (Kant 1991). It would 
consider the laws of particular countries (the degree to which their laws respect human 
rights, for example) as well as the laws governing relations between states (international 
relations) and between residents of different states (transnational relations). In doing so it 
would consider the desirability of adopting or amending particular laws in an actual or 
potential universal legal order constituted internationally, globally, or in a hybrid manner.  
Globalization—understood not as economic liberalization or cultural Americanization but 
as the experienced compression of time and space for people around the world who are 
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increasingly engaged in instantaneous and deterritorialized exchanges with one another—
facilitates that discussion by focusing attention on the rules governing their transactions 
and calling attention to the need for common standards that respect their differences. But 
globalization can also undermine the public realm by empowering enemies of civil 
association at all three levels.  
If the public realm presupposes civil association, we need to look more closely at 
the idea of civil association and its relationship to the rule of law. The public realm can be 
discussed in other terms, but the most widely-used vocabularies—of democracy, human 
rights, civil society, and so forth—are equivocal with respect to the character and aims of 
law and therefore not always suitable tools for analysis. In this paper I discuss the global 
public realm in terms of civil association, relating my discussion to parallel discussions in 
other terms.  
 
Civil association 
The expression ‘public realm’ identifies a space for political deliberation within a legal 
order. The modern territorial state is the paradigm case of such an order. The idea of a 
public realm, following Kant, Arendt, and Habermas, is the idea of a legally protected 
space for free discussion among citizens focused at least in part on the laws under which 
they must live. Within this space, citizens deliberate the terms of their association. The 
public realm is fully realized only in an association of citizens defined by the rule of law, 
where that expression identifies a kind of association that presupposes the freedom of its 
members and respects their rights. Such an association is ‘civil’ rather than religious or 
economic, and its members are ‘citizens’, not believers or stakeholders. The idea of civil 
association has been, since Hobbes, one model of the modern state. That model can be 
contrasted with an alternative idea of the state as an enterprise for promoting sectarian 
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piety, economic prosperity, or some other organizing purpose, and one whose laws are 
understood to be instruments for promoting that purpose. The public realm is attenuated in 
an enterprise state. Any actual state is an ambiguous mixture of civil and enterprise 
association because those ideas define abstract possibilities realized to different degrees in 
different states or in the same state at different times. A state at war, for example, is to 
some extent a purposive enterprise, even when the enterprise is to defend a civil order. 
And declaring a state of emergency moves a political community along the civil-enterprise 
continuum regardless of its previous location on that continuum. In becoming less civil 
and more entrepreneurial it mobilizes people to meet the threat, often against their will, 
and becomes less tolerant of public discourse, which in extreme cases it may try to 
suppress altogether.  
Civil association is association on the basis of a common law. Its unity rests not on 
shared values and beliefs but on its members acknowledging a common authority. When 
citizens can’t agree on substantive matters, they agree to disagree and to accept the 
outcomes of authoritative procedures for settling disputes. In the civil model, law is not 
the outcome of a bargain that rewards interests in proportion to their power but an 
expression of the common good of the community. It is a product of the rational will of 
citizens who understand that coexistence and respect for moral rights requires deference to 
common laws that are something other than a vector of convergent interests. (Philosophers 
have theorized this will as the will of a virtuous and omniscient lawgiver or ideal observer, 
or of citizens themselves in a social contract or original position.) Citizens may be 
contingently united by shared beliefs, values, and interests, but legal authority does not 
presuppose such unity. On the contrary, it can exist in the absence of unity: recognizing 
the authority of a common law may be the only basis for unity possible in the absence of 
substantive agreement. Civil law presupposes difference but also makes it possible. The 
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argument that the authority of government to rule depends on citizens having shared goals 
because law would otherwise lack perceived legitimacy—that people would otherwise not 
be motivated to behave as the law prescribes—confuses the legal authority to govern with 
beliefs about whether that authority is being properly used or is properly grounded in 
morality, utility, or popular consent. It confuses the idea of civil association with one of 
the contingent conditions for realizing that idea, which is that people should be motivated 
to acknowledge and obey the law. A government that lacks legitimacy in this sociological 
sense may fail to generate emotional loyalty. It may fail to govern effectively—that is, to 
exercise its constitutional authority—but its ability to govern is not the ground of its 
authority, nor does governing ineffectively deprive it of authority. 
It is not social differences but the view that such differences are intolerable that 
destroys a legal order. The point of legal authority, on the civil model, is to enable people 
with different beliefs and values to live together. They may think that their laws are unfair, 
ineffective, or bad in some other way, but they must recognize those laws as law. A legal 
order is held together by institutions for enacting laws, for settling disputes over how laws 
should be interpreted in particular cases, and for making sure that people perform their 
legal obligations. Law may become the tool of particular interests, but to the extent that it 
does, it is contrary to civil association. This is true even when the interests it serves are 
those of a majority. Civil association is not democracy. It is a constraint on democratic as 
well as authoritarian power, and laws protecting civil freedom can be enacted according to 
undemocratic procedures. The essence of civil association is that it respects the rights of 
citizens to pursue their own purposes. The right to participate in making decisions is not 
itself a criterion of civil association, which is compatible with a variety of constitutions. 
One of the unresolved questions of political theory (and therefore of a theory of global 
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order) is the conceptual relationship between democracy as a constitutional form and civil 
association or the rule of law as a mode of relationship.  
 
Globalization 
How does globalization affect civil association and the public realm? Does it support or 
undermine civil association? Probably both. In so far as globalization requires financial 
transparency and accountability or gives citizens access to information about public 
policies, it supports civil association. In so far as it subordinates individuals to managerial 
control, it undermines the civil mode. I’ve suggested that the public realm implies public 
discussion of the desirability of civil laws. This means that the public realm is not only 
contingently dependent on the existence of a civil association if it is to flourish but is also 
conceptually related to the idea of civil association. In an enterprise association, where 
laws are policy instruments, deliberating about law means deliberating about policy. Only 
in a civil association can citizens debate the desirability of the laws apart from the policies 
to which those laws might be seen as instrumental. The public realm can therefore be said 
to presuppose the rule of law, understood as a noninstrumental legal framework within 
which citizens pursue goals they choose for themselves. To ask how globalization affects 
the public realm is therefore to ask whether globalization supports or undermines civil 
association, either contingently or conceptually.  
Such inquiries need to be distinguished from arguments about the desirability or 
otherwise of globalization. Much of the globalization literature adopts a prescriptive 
stance. That stance can be progressivist: globalization is good because it is creating a new 
global order that is more prosperous, more democratic, or better in some other way than 
the international order it is replacing, and should for such reasons be encouraged. Or the 
stance can be reactionary: globalization is bad because it increases economic inequality or 
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undermines democracy and should therefore be resisted. But prescription always rests on 
assumptions about how the world works and how information should be categorized, so 
the first questions that need to be asked are causal and conceptual, not practical and 
prescriptive, though the answers to these questions may have practical implications. What 
is the effect of globalization on public realms within or between states, or globally? How 
are the ideas of public realm and civil association related in a global context? What 
conclusions emerge when we adopt the descriptive stance of an observer or theorist of 
globalization and its consequences? 
From the observer standpoint, two arguments about the contingent consequences 
of globalization for civil association can be distinguished. The first is that globalization 
undermines state sovereignty by destroying the conditions for effective state power and 
recognized authority. Political decisions are today often made not by parliaments but by 
unaccountable experts under conditions of technical complexity, speed, and emergency 
that increase managerial control by enabling managers to ever more closely monitor and 
control their ‘human resources’ and by eroding the authority and effectiveness of public 
law as a constraint on management (Scheuerman 2004; Whitman 2005; Koskenniemi 
2007b; Ramraj 2008). The state ceases to be an arena of civic participation or political 
decision as public business is handed over to corporations and other private organizations. 
Autonomy, which civil association assumes for public officials as well as for citizens, 
disappears with the emergence of ‘systems’ that take on a life of their own and escape 
human control. The physician or professor becomes an algorithmic node in an industrial 
process run by computerized ‘enterprise systems’, the citizen a consumer, the politician a 
performer in a play scripted by political consultants. The consequent erosion of civil 
association provokes cynicism and apathy on the part of citizens, and the public realm 
contracts because few can be bothered to occupy the confined space that does exist for 
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democratic deliberation. If the civil order of the state vanishes, civil association will have 
to be reconstituted in some other way if it is to continue as a mode of human relationship 
and to support a public realm. 
A second observer standpoint argument is that globalization is undermining the 
‘Westphalian’ international order based on a society of independent states. If states are 
ceasing to be important, so is international society along with the public international law, 
based on treaties and state practice, that constitutes and regulates that society. No states, 
no international law. This argument reverses the familiar realist claim that state power 
makes international law ineffective and illusory. Here, the weakness of the state has that 
effect. New modes and orders are replacing an international order based on sovereignty, 
intergovernmental diplomacy, and classical international law. According to one version of 
the argument, we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘new world order’ constituted by 
intergovernmental functional associations as inter-state diplomacy is disaggregated into 
networks of officials concerned with different international or transnational policy areas. 
Where governments once interacted diplomatically through their foreign offices, now 
administrative, judicial, and legislative officials in one country transact state business with 
their counterparts in other countries (Slaughter 2004). According to another version of the 
argument, political decisions are increasingly being made within networks that include 
nongovernmental as well as intergovernmental organizations. Non-state actors including 
banks, corporations, trade unions, religious organizations, philanthropic foundations, and 
professional associations interact with governments and intergovernmental agencies to 
determine policy. The result is not supranational government but a decentralized process 
of ‘governance’ in which policies are deliberated and decisions made by various 




The theorists who advance these descriptive models use them to prescribe as well as to 
explain policy. Although many are pessimistic about the prospects for global governance, 
others argue that intergovernmental functional networks or public-private arrangements 
can solve global problems more effectively and justly than intergovernmental cooperation 
through traditional diplomacy or the activities of organizations like the United Nations. 
The optimists also argue that such mechanisms encourage global democracy, civil society, 
and an enlarged global public realm. Several objections to this rosy view come readily to 
mind.  
First, the networks through which governance decisions are made can amplify 
particular interests, such as those of corporate managers or investors, putting them above 
the common good. In doing so, these networks narrow the public realm by weakening the 
rule of law. There are networks of terrorists and drug dealers as well as of human rights 
lawyers and climate scientists. And if, as some argue, networks are ‘deterritiorialized’, 
with the result that people in Internet contact across the globe can be ‘closer’ than people 
living on the same street who do not know one another, this increases the challenges 
facing those charged with regulating them. Networks can democratize policy making by 
exploiting new communication technologies to broaden participation in public debate, but 
they can also undermine democracy by moving decision making out of representative 
institutions into the domain of technical experts (Woods 2002: 34; Florini 2005). It is 
naïve to emphasize the utility of networks as governance mechanisms while ignoring their 
dark side (Kennedy 2004). Given the equivocal character of transnational governance 
networks, advocates for global governance overstate the extent to which such networks 
can establish civil association at the global level.  
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Second, the idea of governance as a complex decision-making process wider than 
government by formally constituted governing authorities erases the distinction between 
the state and ‘civil society’, where the latter stands for social interactions constituted by 
the market or by social movements and voluntary associations. The expression ‘civil 
society’ is unfortunate because it obscures the distinction between that understanding and 
civil association as a nonvoluntary relationship of citizens under a common body of law, 
which is what it meant before Ferguson, Hegel, and others redefined it as the sphere of 
voluntary transactions and relationships. Today, ‘civil society organizations’ are treated by 
governance theorists as the civil conscience and as agents of progress in solving problems 
that governments can’t solve. As with networks, however, one must be careful not to 
claim too much for civil society, which is shaped by organizations with their own interests 
and agendas, including those that are sectarian, extremist, and criminal—so-called ‘bad 
civil society’ (Chambers & Kopstein 2006: 373). Beyond that, and more importantly, the 
idea of governance confuses government with activities outside government that need to 
be governed. What are the rules by which the private or mixed public-private governance 
of networks will proceed? How will rights be preserved and unjust coercion limited? Good 
governance requires a public realm in which policies are debated, but how can there be 
rational public debate if that realm is reserved for experts or corrupted by corporate media 
ownership, advertising, propaganda, censorship, attacks on journalists, and other threats to 
free communication? How can there be a public discourse focused on the desirability of 
laws if the distinction between private and public decisions is blurred and finally 
eradicated? The idea of ‘governance’ obscures elementary distinctions between proper and 
improper governance and between public government and private usurpation of governing 
powers.  
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Third, theorists of global governance fail to grasp the importance of law for civil 
association, and the kind of law that civil association requires. The problem is not only 
that global governance, by itself, is no guarantee of democracy, transparency, rationality, 
or justice. A theory of global governance is inherently incoherent as a theory of the public 
realm. The public realm is a space for deliberation within a state or other legally defined 
political community. It enables discussion of what should and should not be law in such a 
community. Law implies the possibility of coercion because it prescribes obligations and 
provides ways for securing compliance. Public deliberation is therefore about 
prescriptions that are properly enforceable as law within a community. Some advocates 
for deliberative democracy overlook the point that democracy is a way of making legally 
binding decisions. Like other forms of government, democracy depends on laws that 
specify who may participate in making law (by voting or holding office, for example) and 
on whom law can be enforced. And it implies the existence of procedures allowing those 
who are affected by public decisions to participate in making them. As often theorized, 
however, deliberation is detached from making decisions (Bohman 1997; Dryzek 2006). 
Perhaps because everything is seen as political, it seems unnecessary to distinguish 
between political and other kinds of deliberation. But democracy without law yields 
‘discourse’ in a vacuum—a conversation between undefined interlocutors unrelated to the 
business of enacting the laws of a legally defined community.  
Finally, theorists of global governance confuse the rule of law with mixed public-
private regulatory regimes, which they understand less as imposing constraints on policy 
making than as a way of implementing policy. If laws are little more than policy tools, the 
distinction between law and policy disappears. A consequentialist weighing of goods and 
outcomes replaces the categorical distinction between good and right, between desired 
ends and proper or justifiable means. Moral and legal propriety are demoted to the level of 
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desirability and justice to utility. Form and substance merge when procedure becomes the 
servant of substantive policy goals. Furthermore, when a legal system is fragmented  into 
functionally differentiated regulatory regimes, each managed to serve particular interests, 
it loses its coherence as a legal order—a development revealingly identified in the 
globalization literature as the emergence of ‘private’ forms of authority (Albert 2007: 
176). Civil association is corrupted as the boundaries between public and private are 
obscured. The consequence of deformalization and fragmentation is not better governance 
but the disappearance of legal order, domestically or internationally, and therefore of civil 
association and the public realm it supports (Koskenniemi 2007a, 2007c). One result of 
the disintegration of international law, as a practice of states and an idea in the minds of 
international lawyers, is the growth of imperial power at the expense of international law 
and institutions. Westphalian order yields to American hegemony, not the global rule of 
law (Cohen 2006).  
 
Civil association beyond the state 
If civil association means the rule of law, theorists of governance, democracy, and civil 
society in a global context need to connect those ideas to the idea of law. The debate over 
how decisions should be made above the state level is in part a debate about law. The 
European Union, as a hybrid of national and international institutions, inevitably invites 
legal and, especially, constitutional inquiry. But in the larger arena of international law, 
constitutional inquiry has withered along with hopes for the United Nations after the early 
postwar years, to be replaced by political realism, which dismisses international law as 
ineffective, or by inquiries into the effectiveness of international law. American theorists 
of international law in particular are today preoccupied by what they call the compliance 
problem: how to motivate states to obey international law, either by structuring costs and 
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benefits so that incentives for compliance outweigh disincentives or, alternatively, how to 
endow international law with perceived legitimacy by grounding it on shared values and 
beliefs. These are understandable preoccupations for theorists in an imperial state, but they 
suggest a certain lack of perspective. The topic of compliance is worth investigating, but 
to make it the program for international legal theory is to replace traditional jurisprudential 
concerns with the concerns of rational-choice economics or behavioral psychology. The 
study of how to secure compliance through law belongs not to jurisprudence but to a 
tradition of instrumental reflection concerned with acquiring and exercising power. That 
inquiry should not be confused with inquiry into the constitution of a legal order or the 
purposes it should serve. There is, in short, still a need for inquiry into the character and 
constitution of civil association above the level of the state and into the question of what 
laws are desirable at that level.  
 Nonetheless, we cannot escape being concerned with the perceived legitimacy of 
supranational law and with long-running debates on that issue, especially among theorists 
of European order. For many of those theorists, the lesson of the European Union is that 
civil association is unlikely to flourish beyond the nation-state because it is the cultural 
‘nation’ that holds the legal ‘state’ together. According to this view, the main obstacle to 
supranational civil association is that a thin formal order cannot achieve legitimacy unless 
it is rooted in a thick national culture. A nation-state is not an abstraction but a community 
with its own language and history. The wished-for new European identity is a pallid thing 
compared to the German, French, or other identities it is supposed to supplant. So critics 
wonder whether a European, not to mention a global, civil association could generate the 
emotional loyalty of those associated largely by the minimal obligations of a common law. 
They argue that the ‘democratic deficit’ created by globalization works against the 
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postnational patriotism that advocates for the European Union had counted on to support it 
(Habermas 1998).  
In evaluating such arguments one should remember that the states of Europe are 
not exactly ‘nations’. Most have been multinational at some point in their histories, and 
national identity has often followed rather than preceded the creation of a new state. The 
history of European states is a history of efforts to create solidarity among peoples who 
have chosen or been forced to associate with one another within a legal order. If European 
states have been able to achieve social solidarity and national identity in the past, it is at 
least conceivable that an enlarged European state could do the same (Habermas 2002: 
231). So could a world state, though the obstacles are correspondingly larger, especially if 
the cynic is right that there is no solidarity without enemies (Schmitt 1996). Continuing 
globalization might nevertheless eventually create propitious conditions for civil 
association in Europe and elsewhere.  
Attention to the contingent conditions of civil association cannot, then, be avoided 
in thinking about its character and constitution. Kant, for example, advanced the idea of a 
confederation of republics as a second-best solution to the problem of justice at the global 
level because of contingent obstacles to a single world republic. For him, a confederation 
of republics related to one another on the basis of a common law but maintaining their 
independence is a solution dictated by circumstances, not moral principle. The debate over 
global civil association has scarcely moved beyond the theoretical framework that Kant 
articulates, and that insures its current relevance. What constitutional shape should civil 
association take beyond the state? Should that constitution be regional or global? Should it 
be an international, confederal, or unitary constitution? Corresponding to each possible 
constitution is a possible public realm.  
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The first possibility is a single, global, civil association, and a correlative global 
public realm. One can imagine such an association even if its achievement is improbable. 
In more familiar language, one can imagine a world state constituted by laws that respect 
the freedom of people everywhere to participate in public discourse and deliberation. The 
project of cosmopolitan democracy advanced by David Held (1995, 2004), Iris Young 
(2000), and others is to show the practical and moral necessity of global civil association. 
Transnational problems that cannot be managed adequately at the national level must be 
handled by institutions at a higher level, and those institutions must be responsive to all 
who are affected by their decisions. And if there are problems that are truly global in the 
sense that they affect everyone, only global institutions can properly represent everyone’s 
views and interests. Much of the literature in this vein is concerned with strengthening and 
democratizing the United Nations and other supranational institutions. Such concerns put 
this literature in the utopian tradition of world government, whose ideal is a global 
constitutional order or ‘cosmopolis’. We can call this the cosmopolitan model. 
The second possibility is an association of states that is analogically civil in the 
sense that its ‘citizens’—states—are related to one another on the basis of law and in a 
manner that respects their freedom and rights as states. Since they remain independent, the 
law in terms of which states are related is public international law. This association is a 
version of the familiar society of states defined by classical international law. It supports 
an international public realm, not a global one: a sphere of deliberation for representatives 
of states engaged in diplomatic exchanges with one another in various forums (Cohen 
2004; Sellers 2006). But the states that compose this international civil association are not 
necessarily civil associations. Call this the international model. It is the model of a society 
of states based on the rule of international law, and it allows states that are not themselves 
rule-of-law states to participate. It should not be confused with an association of civil 
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associations that falls short of being itself a civil association because its members, which 
though they are themselves civil associations, are joined in a purposive enterprise for 
defense, economic development, or some other substantive purpose. Alliances or free 
trade zones are examples of international enterprise association.  
Finally, imagine a civil association of civil associations. This is the confederation 
of rule-of-law states imagined by Kant, partly achieved in the European Union, and 
advocated as ‘democratic regionalism’ or a ‘society of peoples’ (Habermas 2002; Rawls 
1999). Call this the civil confederal model. ‘Confederal’ is a better term than ‘regional’ for 
such an association, provided we remember that we are speaking of a civil confederation 
of states that are themselves civil associations, because a confederation could in theory 
emerge among geographically separated states, like those of the British Commonwealth. 
Civil association at this level is a complex idea embracing (1) a civil relationship between 
states as the analogous ‘citizens’ of an inter-state association—in other words, one defined 
by international laws that are more than merely instrumental and meet the criteria of the 
rule of law—and (2) legal orders within each state that meet the requirements of civil 
association or the rule of law. Such an association—a civil confederation of civil states—
could become universal, as Kant, Rawls, and others have imagined, were every state to 
become a civil association and to join the confederation. But as long as member states 
retained their independence, even a universal confederation would fall short of being a 
world state or ‘cosmopolis’ because its legal order would be a dualistic system of national 
and international law, not a unitary system of cosmopolitan law.  
From a cosmopolitan standpoint, it would seem that the public realm supported by 
a universal confederation could be little more than an aggregate of separate national public 
discourses together with an international diplomatic discourse, and that it would therefore 
not be a truly global public realm. The confederal model can extend civil association 
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beyond national borders, but it cannot realize the idea of a truly global civil association. 
For cosmopolitans, a world state is needed because global civil association can be based 
only on a system of global law. The confederal model provides not global law but, at best, 
only a combination of national and international law—in other words, a combination of 
civil association within and between states. Civil association at the level of the state 
supports public realms within each member state, and the treaty-based civil association in 
which these states are confederally united supports an international public realm. But 
without a global civil association, there can be no global public realm. 
I think this reasoning is mistaken. The jurisdiction of public discourse is more 
inclusive than that of law. It is not entirely constrained by the discursive equivalent of the 
nonintervention principle. Citizens can have opinions about and even try to influence the 
laws of other states. And they can argue about the laws of a confederation to which their 
own state belongs, even if those laws are international rather than supranational. And to 
the degree that a confederal treaty provides a basis for the emergence of transnational or 
supranational law, space for public deliberation focused on that emerging law is created. 
The idea of a civil confederation of civil associations therefore creates the possibility that 
a confederal public realm might expand beyond inter-governmental diplomacy to include 
a transnational dialogue of citizens with multiple loyalties. The Kantian idea of a 
republican confederation of republics allows for the emergence of institutions supporting 
an inclusive public realm, and the discussions that go in that realm can in turn strengthen 
confederal institutions and reshape the identities of states and their citizens to support a 
supranational and potentially global civil order (Bohman 1997; Calhoun 2002: 302). This 
idea is the idea of European union, European identity, and a European public realm writ 
large, and it invites a debate similar to that which has been going on for a long time in the 
European context (Bellamy 2006). But far from challenging the idea of a global public 
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realm, that debate is evidence of its vigor. I think this answers the objection that a global 
Kantian federation cannot substitute for a global state because it does not create a global 
public realm.  
 
Global constitutionalism 
It is sometimes said that in Perpetual Peace Kant explicitly rejects the idea of a 
global legal order by insisting that ‘cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality’ (Kant 1991: 105). But this reads too much into the quoted sentence. 
Kant means by it that although people have a right to travel freely throughout the world, 
they do not necessarily have the right to settle where they wish. A state is not obligated to 
permit foreigners to enter its territory as immigrants, and therefore in effect to provide 
them with substantive benefits. Kant is worried about the problem of colonial settlement, 
which in the guise of commerce or beneficence is really a coercive intrusion on the rights 
of non-European peoples. If such peoples were obligated to allow foreigners to settle, 
Europeans would have a right to move in and, given their superior resources, they would 
eventually displace or conquer their hosts. But because every human being has a moral 
right to live somewhere, a state cannot refuse to receive foreigners if doing so would result 
in their deaths (Kant 1991: 106). There is, in other words, a right of refuge and a 
correlative duty of asylum. Kant’s objections to a global legal order lie elsewhere, in the 
practical difficulties of establishing and maintaining a world republic and, more 
importantly, in the morally legitimate existence of separate states and the risk that states 
already enjoying republican constitutions would incur by submitting to a less fully 
republican confederal constitution (Laberge 1998: 93). 
It might be argued that the Kantian model is too conservative because we now 
have, as a consequence of globalization, something Kant could imagine but not observe: 
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an emergent global constitution. Is it true, as some international legal theorists now claim, 
that a global constitution already exists? To answer the question we need a definition of 
‘global constitution’. One might look for such a definition in the constitutional discourse 
of the European Union. Had it been adopted, the proposed European Constitution, though 
itself a treaty, would have established genuine supranational institutions by locating the 
Union’s authority in a document whose interpretation was in the hands of a constitutional 
court, the European Court of Justice. The failure of a sufficient number of member states 
to ratify the treaty not only reaffirms the international rather than supranational character 
of the European Union but also reinforces the familiar distinction between a state founded 
on a document whose terms are interpreted by a constitutional court and a confederation 
founded on treaties that leave important matters in the hands of independent member 
states. There are, however, other ways to understand European constitutionalism. It can be 
argued that the treaties that constitute the European Union are its constitution, and this 
constitution is already to some degree supranational. In particular, a body of European law 
has emerged that is supranational as well as transnational because it forms a hierarchical 
system. It allows some judicial intervention by the European Court of Justice and other 
European courts, which can decide disputes between litigants at different levels, uphold 
human rights, and enforce constitutional safeguards for minorities. One can therefore 
speak of a European ‘constitutional politics’ even in the absence of a formal constitution 
(O’Sullivan 2004: 183). 
Similar arguments have been used to support the claim that a global constitution 
can be identified in the United Nations Charter and in the complex system of transnational 
rules and institutions that in the past half century has emerged beside but has not replaced 
classical international law (Fassbender 1998; Teubner 1997). In contrast to theorists of 
global governance, who explicitly challenge the distinction between law and non-law, 
 20 
theorists of global constitutionalism do distinguish between law and politics. They are 
concerned with issues of legal authority and obligation and with how law is made and 
interpreted in novel ways in this emergent global legal system. They distinguish the rules 
and principles of this system from ‘soft law’, private regulations, policies resulting from a 
mixed private-public decision process, and other non- or quasi-legal practices examined in 
the global governance literature. The idea of a constitution relied on by theorists of global 
constitutionalism does not allow private organizations to assume legal powers. It does, 
however, support national courts in exercising new legal powers by applying foreign, 
transnational, international, and supranational law. It also invites the creation of tribunals 
to handle cases arising in under special legal regimes such as human rights law, the law of 
the sea, and international criminal law. The result is a complex, polycentric, universal 
legal system that is in some ways the functional equivalent of constitutional law and 
institutions within a state. From a constitutionalist perspective, human rights are the 
cosmopolitan equivalent of civil liberties within this global legal system. National and 
regional courts draw upon and in turn strengthen the global system by interpreting and 
applying its rules and principles (Cohen 2004: 10). To critics who object that they 
exaggerate the cosmopolitan aspects of public international law, global constitutionalists 
respond that their reading of that law, though an ‘academic artifact’, is a permissible one 
that points the way towards a supranational legal order (Peters 2005: 39).  
The constitutional debate, like many others in international law, raises issues that 
will be resolved only by experience. Whether, for example, the proliferation of specialized 
tribunals will contribute to fragmentation or, eventually, to a stronger global legal order, 
cannot be settled by theoretical inquiry. But theory can tell us that a constitution implies 
unity, for a constitutional order is a single reasonably coherent system of law. That system 
need not rest on a written constitution but it must amount to more than the parallel 
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existence of distinct functional regimes. It must unite these regimes into a self-consistent 
whole, which implies procedures for reconciling their different rules. As Koskenniemi, 
Cohen, and other critics maintain, the current fragmentation of international and 
transnational law precludes a unified global constitutional framework. A constitution also 
implies hierarchy: constitutional law is higher law. International lawyers sometimes argue 
that hierarchy in international law is achieved in the concept of jus cogens, which refers to 
rules of law that override other rules when apparent incompatibilities arise. So, for 
example, a treaty among several states to permit forced labor would be overridden by 
international human rights law, which because of its fundamental character forbids it. 
There is much to be said for the idea of jus cogens from the standpoint of the rule of law, 
which implies moral constraints on positive law, whether that law is enacted, agreed to by 
treaty, or generated in a process of customary law formation (Nardin 2008). But jus 
cogens can only serve to unify a legal system if the courts that interpret its rules as they 
apply in particular situations produce a consistent body of case law. Merely postulating a 
normative hierarchy does not establish the actual existence of that hierarchy in the absence 
of evidence of consistent judicial practice—evidence that some, at least, would argue is so 
far lacking.  
But although we must view with skepticism the claim that a global constitution 
already exists, there is no conceptual obstacle to the existence of such a constitution. If 
supranational law has emerged within the European Union, it could emerge within a more 
inclusive confederation. In the meantime, however, it would be foolish to mistake 
evidence of progress towards a global civil association for proof that its establishment is 
inevitable. We must reject the teleology implicit in global utopianism. History is about the 
past, not the future, and it consists not in a process determined by the laws of history but 
only in events contingently related to one other in ways that might have been other than 
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they are. We can, however, look for evidence of a global public realm as events occur—
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